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It was a bitter cold January 2009. The people of Romania and the Balkans were especially 
badly affected by the chilly winds coming from the northeast. But the chill was not only to be 
blamed on the cold weather — this time the supply of gas in people’s homes and workplaces 
was caused by the indefinite severing of gas by the domestic energy companies. Unlike past 
incidents of this nature, where interruption may have been caused by breakdowns in the 
ageing, Soviet-era infrastructure, there was something more ‘global’ to this latest problem. 
Not a sign of the post-credit crunch crisis of domestic energy suppliers failing to pay 
wholesalers, but a crisis that exposed the vulnerability of countries relying on Russian gas 
supplies. While Romania and the Balkans were especially vulnerable because of their low 
reserves, Russia’s standoff with Ukraine over the transfer of its gas, and the eventual cutting 
off of supplies, was a clear message to the rest of Europe. 
 
This is the kind of story that captured the imagination of journalists and commentators 
— Here was Russia flexing its muscles on the international arena using its natural resources, 
gas and oil, as strategic weapons. The stoking of stereotypes was decisive in painting an 
unmistakable picture of villains and victims in this drama, helping the public see the moral 
superiority of the West and the reasons for why sometimes the Western governments go to 
wars. But the real story was at once more complex and more simple: Ukraine was accused, 
and was most likely guilty, of syphoning gas for domestic consumption, while continuing to 
buy Russian gas at subsidised prices. Far from being an international bully, Russia’s 
state-controlled Gazprom was trying to keep to long-term delivery contracts with European 
customers. And, it was the leading European energy companies, Germany’s E.On and Italy’s 
Enel, with stakes in Gazprom and some of Russia's key gas production and transit assets, that 
were the more vocal proponents (with Gazprom) that Ukraine’s price for gas should fall in line 
with world prices. The message wasn’t lost on major Atlantic political strategists — if Russia 
was not left to its political sphere of influence, Western companies may not  reap the 
economic benefits they were reaping in the last decade.     
 
This is the kind of analysis Pirani’s superb book offers scholars of international business: a 
behind the headlines look at Russian political economy that focuses on the social and political 
forces shaping Russian institutions and capitalism, and shaping its integration into the world 
market. Pirani looks at the decade under Vladimir Putin, and the focus is on the intersection 
of three elements: Power, Money and People. Written in an accessible style, Pirani manages to 
purvey a narrative that combines an attentive drawing together of historical detail and 
analytical reasoning with an astute, time-honed journalistic knack for linking events, places 
and people.  
 
International business scholars will find the first six chapters of the book especially valuable. 
The first of these starts from a story that precedes the period apparently associated with the 
title of the book — the end of the Soviet system, the passing of control from Gorbachev to 
Yeltsin, and the political-economic and institutional reforms associated with a transition to 
capitalism. We learn how problems associated with the contradictions of the Soviet system of 
production mobilised ideas and sentiments among the elite about the way forward, and how 
these were shaped to a considerable degree by the ascendant neoliberalism of Western Europe 
and the US. While the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet system and embrace of 
capitalism lay with the Soviet elite itself, the international financial institutions, Western 
policy advisers and quasi-public bodies, and private companies lined up behind Yeltsin’s new 
government to offer expertise in financial policy, institutional design and market know-how 
that would make Russia’s vast industry and its people (i.e. consumers) readily available to 
Western investors. With the Rouble artificially inflated, imports of Western goods flooded into 
Russia, while the Monetarist policies meant the Russian industry was starved of investment 
funds necessary to realise the early dreams of the market solving the Soviet problem of low 
productivity and technological lag.  
 
There were plenty of opportunities in the 1990s for Western companies to benefit from 
Russian reforms, though these were limited to speculation and imports, a topic covered in 
great detail in chapter two. The more lucrative parts of the Russian economy lied well beyond 
the reach of Western investors. The new Russian elite, realising that the value of their 
personal wealth, though already beyond anything imaginable only five years earlier, was 
minuscule comparing to the sums commanded by multinationals which were poised to win in 
any independent privatisation auction for the country’s most prised assets (i.e. oil, gas, 
metallurgy, precious metals, and petrochemistry). As luck would have it, Yeltsin’s popularity 
was catastrophically low, the government was bankrupt, and the people were becoming 
disillusioned with transition. The new elite gave him an offer he could not refuse: financial 
support in return for prised assets at knock down prices in rigged auctions. The oligarchs were 
created overnight, and Western investors and the media cried fowl. All this was no guarantee 
against crises: sticking with Washington's advice of Monetarism and continuing borrowing 
and issuing bonds that greatly benefited Wall Street and the major banks, the Kremlin was in 
no position to repay, eventually facing the crisis in 1998, and seeing the ascendance of the 
group within the elite hellbent on preventing a similar fiasco in the future.  
 
Putin, though Yeltsin's chosen successor, brought a gear change in Russia's exposure to 
international business and th country's integration into world capitalism. Chapters 3 to 6 
detail how Putin and his close allies presided over an oil bonanza. There was the initial 
strengthening of the state apparatus by subordinating all branches of government to the 
executive (usually by employing Putin loyalists from the former KGB or the military). There 
was also a clear demarcation of control between the state and capital: the oligarchs were 
reigned in and told to become as rich as they wished, but to abandon any political ambitions. 
Anyone who disobeyed found themselves in hot waters a la Khodorkovsky's imprisonment. 
And while Western media presented such moves as a battle between the defenders of 
democracy and the authoritarian state, stoking fears of a return to Soviet times, in truth the 
Kremlin’s appropriation of majority share-ownership in oil and gas was in line with 
international experience during the boom years. Whatever the tactics of the Kremlin, the 
reality is that under Putin there was a massive influx of foreign investors into Russia, and 
primarily into the very oil and gas sectors in which the state strengthened its ownership. This 
was followed by another wave of privatisations, the likes of which Yeltsin era neoliberal 
reformers could only dream of. It, together with the favourable currency regime, enticed many 
European and American companies to set up manufacturing, service, consumer finance and 
construction businesses in Russia. Simultaneously, there was a steady increase in share 
ownership by Russian companies in Western economies, and the floating of Russian 
companies on the London, New York and Frankfurt stock exchanges. While some Russian 
money flew abroad, this was more than offset by the colossal capital inflow into Russia.  
 
Western capital benefited greatly during this decade from the political stability provided by 
Putin's government. While some of this was created by the steady increase in the people’s 
standard of living fuelled by rising oil prices, it was also maintained by the suppression of 
political dissent, state control of the media, and the exertion of various forms of harassment, 
marginalization and impoverishment of vast parts of the population. This is the story told in 
the remaining chapters of the book. While not central to international business 
considerations, scholars are advised to pay heed to Pirani’s well considered analysis of these 
problems as directly or indirectly attributable to the benefits accrued to the multinationals in 
Russia during the last decade. The paradox is, these developments threaten the longer-term 
political stability of the country that multinationals so badly crave. The great wealth and the 
opportunities for business are overshadowed by the haemorrhaging demographic and social 
crises. The combination of these with people's sense of frustration and anger recently brought 
millions in protest to the streets of Russia's major cities. The sad fact facing Russian politics 
and multinationals that want to continue doing business in the country is that there is today a 
diminishing number of political options for the political elite to exercise, making Putin’s close 
circle ever more fearful and unpredictable. The complacency of Western multinationals in 
Putin’s Russia has been as blameworthy as the regime itself in making present-day popular 
anger and the politics of protest a reality. The ethical choice facing multinationals today is 
whether to support the Russian people in their own efforts to build more just institutions and 
more democratic forms of governance, or to chase the chimera of stability under Putin. 
Pirani’s excellent primer on business, politics and society in Russia invites us to consider these 
options with a sober view of the problems of the uneven and combined globalisation of 
capitalism today. 
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